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ABSTRACT
A SOCIAL COGNITIVE MODEL OF DETECTING DECEPTION
MAY 2001
JAMES A. FORREST, B.A., FAIRFIELD UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph • D
. ,
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Robert S. Feldman
In this dissertation, three studies investigate
how a person's beliefs about the cues that indicate
deception are related to actual accuracy in detecting
deception. Based on social cognition research, it was
hypothesized that people with accurate beliefs about
the cues that predict deception are better at detecting
deception only when those beliefs are cognitively
available and activated. In contrast, without
activation of appropriate beliefs, detection will be no
better than for those with inaccurate beliefs.
Study I tested this hypothesis in a laboratory
study, where participants viewed video fragments of
people who are either being honest or dishonest. A
questionnaire measured participants' beliefs and the
activation of these beliefs was accomplished by
manipulating suspicion. Study I provided clear
evidence for the main hypothesis, where suspicious
v
participants who had accurate beliefs were better at
detecting deception compared to other participants.
In Study II, a modified belief questionnaire was
administered to 669 undergraduate participants in order
to have a better understanding of the attributes of a
scale that attempts to measure people's beliefs about
the cues that predict deception.
Study III attempted to conceptually replicate
Study I in a field study. Undergraduate participants
watched a video of actual passengers who either were or
were not attempting to pass contraband past an
experimenter. This study did not show the same pattern
of results as Study I, but did show that suspicious
participants were better at detecting deception.
Study IV attempted to teach and activate the
beliefs about cues that predict deception. Either
correct or incorrect beliefs were taught to the
participants and participants' involvement was
manipulated. The main test of the hypothesis in this
study did not show an increase in accuracy for
participants who were highly involved and given the
correct cues, but indirect evidence suggest that belief
accuracy may be related to participant's detection
accuracy.
vi
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CHAPTER I
A SOCIAL COGNITIVE MODEL OF DETECTING DECEPTION
Introduction
Accurately detecting deception is an important
abili ty that not only benefits law officers and other
criminal justice professionals on the job, but laypersons
as well (e.g., Ekman, 1985; DePaulo, 1994; Kraut & Poe,
1980)
. For example, detectives need to separate the
trustworthy from the untrustworthy statements made by
witnesses. Similarly, in legal cases, judges and juries
must be able to accurately identify honest testimony from
perjurious testimony. For laypersons, the ability to
detect deception may help in avoiding unpleasant
situations such as being taken in by the claims of an
unscrupulous salesperson.
Despite the apparent usefulness of being able to
detect deception accurately (and presumably the ample
opportunity to practice such skills)
,
one would expect
that people generally would be good lie detectors, but
this is not the case. Various researchers have
consistently found that people are able to detect
deception at a rate only slightly above chance level
1
1981; Knapp & Comoneda,
(DePaulo, 1999; Miller & Burgoon,
1979)
.
Although it seems that criminal justice
professionals should be better at detecting deception,
research findings suggest that experts are no more adept
at detecting deception than lay persons, except for a few
isolated groups (Ekman & O'Sullivan, 1991) . Furthermore,
Vrij and Semin (1996) showed that expert lie detectors
such as customs officers, police detectives, prison
guards, and non-experts had erroneous -- and similar --
beliefs about which behaviors indicate deception in
others
.
Some research has attempted to identify the people
who are good detectors of deceit based on particular
personality factors and other individual differences
(DePaulo & Tang, 1994), but there has been little success
in this endeavor (see DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter, 1985;
DePaulo, 1994 for review) . For example, meta-analyses
have not found any systematic gender differences in the
ability to detect deception (DePaulo, Epstein, & Wyer,
1993), and the evidence for personality factors that
predict a person's ability to detect deception is mixed
(Keating & Heltman, 1994; DePaulo & Tang, 1994).
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Distinguishing Between Accurate and Inaccurate Lie
Detectors
Although the results of recent studies do not
provide individual difference criteria to use in
distinguishing between good lie detectors and poor lie
detectors, we do know that some people are simply better
detectors of deception than others are. For example,
Ekman and O'Sullivan (1991) found that Secret Service
agents were significantly better than others at detecting
deception. Another study by Frank and Ekman (1996)
showed that people who are good at detecting deception in
one context are also good at detecting deception in other
contexts. These findings suggest that there are people
who are good at picking up the cues that predict
deception and using that information to accurately decode
deception. The problem we face is identifying these
people and understanding why they are good at detecting
deception, while the majority of people are relatively
poor at it.
Attributions of Deceptiveness
One line of research that has addressed this
question has concentrated on assessing cues that people
actually use when attempting to detect deception (Kraut,
1978; Kraut & Poe, 1980; Vri j , 1993). The basic
assumption is that the attribution about deception that a
3
person (the judge) makes is linked to other attributions
relating to the person being judged for deception
(target), such as how nervous the target seems, untidy
dressing (Vrij & Winkel, 1993), and less smiling on the
part of the target (Vrij, 1993). Consequently, if a
judge's attributions correspond to cues that in general
predict deception, then the person should be more
accurate in detecting deception.
Attribution studies usually measure the nonverbal
behaviors of the persons being judged (target persons)
,
who are being either truthful or untruthful, and also
measure judges' attributions for various aspects of the
way the targets come across, including how truthful each
target person seems. For example, Kraut (1978) found
that expert lie detectors relied heavily on the
plausibility of a story when forming an impression about
how deceptive a target person was. It is not clear from
the research the degree of awareness that people have
about the processes that they use to detect deception.
This line of research has given us a greater
understanding of the way people attribute deception to
others. One drawback of this approach is that no
causality can be established. That is, it is not known
if the attribution of plausibility affects the way a
person attributes deceptiveness, or if the attribution of
4
deceptiveness affects how plausible a story seems, or if
some other unmeasured factor mediates the relationship.
Belief Accuracy
Another line of research has concentrated on the
beliefs that judges have about which behaviors predict
deception. This research stems from various studies on
the nonverbal behaviors that people actually enact when
they are deceiving or attempting to deceive (DePaulo,
1992; DePaulo, et al
. , 1985; Zuckerman, & Driver; 1985).
In addition, this line of research assumes that accurate
beliefs about the cues that predict deception should lead
to better detection.
A meta-analysis by DePaulo and colleagues finds that
attempted deception is correlated with behaviors such as
increased speech disturbances, higher-pitched voice,
longer latency period, slower speech rate, and decreased
leg and arm movement (DePaulo, et al
. ,
1985) . These
meta-analyses have provided a starting point for research
concerning the beliefs that people have about the cues
that predict deception.
In a study performed in the Netherlands, Vrij and
Semin (1996) compared the beliefs that purportedly expert
lie detectors (police officers), college students, and
convicted criminals have regarding the nonverbal
behaviors that indicate deception. Surprisingly, they
5
found that police officers and college students have
similar -- and incorrect -- beliefs about the nonverbal
indicators of deception, but that convicted criminals had
somewhat more accurate beliefs. They also found that
more successful officers (those officers who had made the
most arrests) did not have more accurate beliefs.
Although the research on the belief structure of lie
detectors is based on the idea that more accurate beliefs
should lead to better lie detection, these researchers
did not investigate the possible link between belief and
judgment of deception in an experimental setting.
Belief Structure and Deception Detection Accuracy
Although research has examined people's beliefs
about cues associated with deception, only one published
study has investigated the effects of beliefs people hold
on their accuracy in detecting deception (Anderson et
al
. ,
1999)
.
In this study, participants (senders) were
honest and dishonest to same-sex friends (judges) . Each
judge then identified when he or she thought the sender
was being honest and dishonest. Judges also identified
the cues they used in order to make their decision about
deceptiveness. The cues mentioned were coded into
verbal, visual, and paralinguist ic cues. The results of
this study showed that judges could not distinguish
between true and fabricated stories on the explicit
6
measure of deceptiveness. Nevertheless, judges mentioned
more verbal cues when the story was truthful and more
visual cues when the story was fabricated. Furthermore,
mention of paralinguistic cues was positively correlated
with accuracy in detecting deception.
This study provides the first tentative evidence
that beliefs about the cues that predict deception are
associated with deception detection accuracy and serves
as a stepping stone for the hypotheses laid out in this
dissertation. This study provides some evidence for a
cognitive model of deception detection, where there is a
direct relationship between the beliefs people hold about
the cues that predict deception and their actual accuracy
in detecting deception.
That Anderson and colleagues' (1999) study is the
only published investigation on the belief structure of
the person attempting to detect deception is surprising
given that most training methods designed and
investigated by researchers (e.g., Zuckerman et al
.
,
1984) assume that more accurate beliefs about behaviors
indicative of deception should facilitate lie detection.
This lack of studies is especially surprising because the
pattern of results of the Anderson et al . (1999) study
are not all that clear.
7
Social-Cognitive Factors in Detecting Deception
Other researchers have investigated whether various
social-cognitive factors influence accuracy in detecting
deception (e.g., Forrest & Feldman, 2000; Toris &
DePaulo, 1985; Burgoon & Buller, 1994). Some theories
suggest that a judge's social-cognitive motivation may
affect the nonverbal displays and behaviors of senders,
and vice-versa (Burgoon et al
. ,
1999)
. Most studies
investigating the role of social
-cognitive factors
affecting detection accuracy (e.g., Toris & DePaulo,
1985; Forrest & Feldman, 2000) hypothesize that a
person's motivation changes the way he or she attempts to
detect deception, which may or may not lead to increased
accuracy in detecting deception. Most probably,
motivators affect both the judge's behaviors and
judgements, and the sender's reciprocal behaviors.
Toris and DePaulo (1985) looked at suspicion as a
possible moderator of accuracy in detecting deception,
suggesting that people who are suspicious should pay more
attention to the relevant cues to deception, and
therefore are more accurate in detecting deception.
Participants acting as "interviewers" interviewed two
"applicants" who were either introverts or extraverts
(measured by the Eysenck Personality Inventory; Eysenck &
Eysenck, 1969) who presented themselves either as
8
introverts and extraverts; therefore "applicants" either
gave an honest or dishonest representation of themselves.
"Interviewers" were either primed to suspect deception or
were not primed. It was expected that suspiciousness
would increase accuracy in distinguishing between the
applicants" who were actually extraverts and introverts.
Surprisingly, this study failed to find a clear
relationship between suspicion and the ability to
distinguish between honest and dishonest representations.
Forrest and Feldman (2000) investigated the effects
of motivation in a person's accuracy in detecting
deception. This study showed video fragments of target
persons who were either honest or dishonest to
participants who were either highly motivated to
scrutinize a message or participants who were not highly
motivated. It was found that people who were highly
motivated were less effective at detecting deception
compared to people who were not highly motivated.
Forrest and Feldman (2000) reasoned that people in
the high involvement condition attended to the behaviors
they thought predict deception, and people in the low
involvement condition used automatic processes to arrive
at their ratings of truthfulness. If this is the case,
then people in the high involvement condition may have
been less proficient in detecting deception because
9
people in general hold erroneous beliefs about the cues
that predict deception.
Act ivating Beliefs Increases Detection Accuracy
It is clear that the research has failed to identify
(a) the critical factors that would predict who is and
who is not a good lie detector, and (b) the relationship
between the beliefs that people hold and their accuracy
in detecting deception. The proposed research project
examines the joint effects of suspicion and people's
beliefs about what cues are associated with deception.
Work in social cognition and personality suggests that
correct beliefs about what cues are associated with
deception are useless if those beliefs are not activated
when making a judgment (Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Epstein,
1990)
.
Specifically, if we activate people's beliefs
about cues associated with deception, and those beliefs
are accurate, people will rely on those beliefs and make
accurate judgments. On the other hand, if the beliefs
that are activated are wrong, then people's accuracy in
detecting deception should not be great.
Possible benefits derived from the investigation of
the hypotheses presented in this dissertation should help
in providing needed groundwork for deception detection
training. Training methods used in psychological studies
(e.g., Zuckerman, Koestner, & Alton, 1984; Ansfield, et
10
accuracy
al*' 1997 ) have assumed that deception detection
should increase simply by teaching someone which
nonverbal behaviors indicate deception. Researchers in
this area have found that teaching people to be better at
detecting deception is not a simple and straightforward
process. The hypotheses tested in this dissertation
suggest that training methods have ignored a crucial
aspect of the decision making process -- a person's
motivation
.
In order to understand the relationship between a
person's beliefs about the cues that predict deception,
and a person's ability to detect deception, two competing
models were investigated. Specifically, this study will
investigate (1) whether a person's accuracy in the
beliefs about behaviors that indicate deception has a
direct relationship to the accuracy in detecting
deception, or (2) whether the relationship between
beliefs and deception detection accuracy is moderated by
a person's motivation. That is, do these beliefs have to
be activated in a more direct manner for this
relationship to appear? If the simple, direct approach
(activation of beliefs is not necessary) is correct, then
training methods designed to help professionals become
better lie detectors should concentrate on what people do
when they attempt to deceive. On the other hand, if the
11
interaction model (activation of beliefs is a necessary
condition for accurate detection of deception) is
correct, then training methods should concentrate on both
people's motivators and what behaviors they should attend
to when attempting to detect deception.
The Present Studies
The overarching hypothesis of the proposed studies
is that people who have accurate beliefs about which cues
predict deception should be better at detecting deception
compared to people who have inaccurate beliefs. However,
it is expected that this difference will be apparent only
when the beliefs are activated.
Specifically, Fein (1996) has shown that suspicion
results in more effortful and sophisticated thinking.
Other researchers have also shown that suspicious people
attend more closely to the cues that are associated with
deception compared to people who are not suspicious
(Zuckerman, et al
. ,
1982; DePaulo, et al
. ,
1982).
Judge's involvement has also been associated with an
increase in attention to verbal cues when judging
deception (Stiff et al
. ,
1989). Consequently, it is
expected that suspicion and involvement will activate
people's beliefs about the relevant cues to which they
should attend in order to achieve the goal of being
accurate
.
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In Studies I and III, it is hypothesized that the
people who are most accurate at detecting deception will
be those who are suspicious and have accurate beliefs
about which cues predict deception. In the studies, the
predictions were investigated using laypersons (college
students) as the ones making the judgments. Furthermore,
both college students and a sample of airline passengers
at a large international airport were the target persons
in order to extend the generalizability of the results.
In Study IV, training was given to participants.
This training consisted of presenting judges with
behaviors that either predict or do not predict deception
in order to experimentally manipulate people's beliefs.
In addition, an involvement manipulation similar to that
used in the Forrest and Feldman (2000) study was used in
order to prime the learned beliefs. It was expected that
participants who were taught the correct beliefs would be
better at detecting deception, but only when they were
motivated to be accurate.
13
CHAPTER II
STUDY I : WHEN ACCURATE BELIEFS LEAD TO BETTER LIE
DETECTION
Overview
This study tested the hypothesis that people who
have accurate beliefs about the cues that predict
deception are better at detecting deception, but only
when the beliefs are activated. A questionnaire measured
participant's beliefs about cues predictive of deception.
It was thought that by varying participant's level of
suspicion, activation of beliefs would be manipulated.
Therefore, high levels of suspicion would activate
people's held beliefs about the cues that predict
deception, while low levels of suspicion would not
activate people's beliefs.
Method
Participants
Sixty-eight undergraduates were recruited from
introductory psychology classes and acted as judges. For
their participation, they were given extra credit in
their introductory course. Experimental sessions were
performed in groups ranging in size from 2 to 10 judges
at a time.
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Stimulus Material
Judges watched a video consisting of 33 15-second
fragments of 8 men and 8 women being either honest or
dishonest, which lasted approximately 15 minutes. The
first fragment was used to familiarize the judges with
the procedure. These fragments were randomly selected
from a pool of video fragments used in a previous
experiment (Forrest and Feldman, 2000)
.
The procedure to make the stimulus tape replicates
the procedures outlined by DePaulo, Kirkendol, Tang, and
O'Brien (1988). Targets were run one at a time and told
that "the study consisted of people's ability to make
impressions on others in different situations." First,
the target person was told that the other participant had
not arrived yet, but in the meantime, he or she could
fill out a questionnaire. While waiting for the other
participant (who was fictitious)
,
the target person was
asked if he or she agreed or disagreed with each of the
four attitude statements. The statements were: (1) The
death penalty should be instituted in all states; (2)
There is too much violence on television; (3) Nuclear
power plants are not very safe; and (4) The government
should put further restrictions on immigration. These
four attitude statements were selected from a larger pool
of statements on the basis of the following criteria: (1)
15
was close to the
the mean attitude rating for each item
midpoint; (2) the items were not intercorrelated
; and ( 3 )
most people did not regard the issue described in the
items as "very important" or "very unimportant."
After 2 minutes, the experimenter collected the
questionnaire and handed out a set of instructions. The
target person read the instructions, which explained that
the aim of the study was to examine the ability to make
impressions on others in difficult circumstances.
While the target person read the instructions, the
experimenter prepared four envelopes, labeled 1 through
4, each of which contained instructions for one of the
issues. Each instruction form indicated the target's own
position, the "partner's" alleged position, and the
position that the target should convey on the videotape.
The "partner's" position was manipulated to be the same
as the target's position on half the statements, and
opposite to the target's position on the other half.
Additionally, each target was asked to convey his or her
true position on two of the issues, and a false position
on the other two issues. Consequently, each target
conveyed two honest messages and two dishonest messages.
The order of the issues, and the order of the type of
message (honest/dishonest), was randomly assigned to each
target person.
16
When the experimenter returned, each target person
was told that during the session, he or she would have to
open one envelope, read the instructions, think about
what to say, and present a position on each of the
attitude statements. This procedure was followed until
all the envelopes were opened and all four attitude
statements were addressed. After each target person was
finished with all four attitude messages, he or she was
debriefed, and consent was obtained to use the videotapes
for future research.
Procedure
Judges were given the written instructions that
contained the suspicion manipulation, where judges in the
high suspicion condition were told that target persons
are "usually" untruthful, while participants in the low
suspicion condition were told that the target persons are
"sometimes" untruthful. The instructions explained that
the study concerns people's ability to make impressions
on others, and indicated the issues that the target
persons discuss in the video. After all the judges read
the instructions, the experimenter asked if there were
any questions, and then began the videotape. After each
fragment, judges were given 10 seconds to answer the
following questions: (1) To what extent do you think this
person was truthful? (2) To what extent do you believe
17
these arguments represent what the person actually
believes? (3) Was this person basically honest or
dishonest in his or her statement? Questions (1) and (2)
were followed by a 9-point scale anchored at very
untruthful - very truthful for question (1) and not at
all - completely for question (2)
.
Question (3) was
followed by the words Honest and Dishonest, and the
judges were asked to mark one of the two. All three
questions were designed to measure how honest or
dishonest the person on the tape seemed to the judge (see
Appendix A)
.
Following the viewing and judgments on all 33
fragments, the experimenter administered the nonverbal
cue belief questionnaire (see Appendix B) to the judges.
This 18-item questionnaire was constructed using the
results of a meta-analysis of the cues associated with
deception (DePaulo, et al
. ,
1985). Each item asked how
likely is it for someone not telling the truth to perform
a specific nonverbal behavior, for example, increased eye
contact, and the 9 -point scale was anchored at very
unlikely and very likely. After the judges completed the
belief questionnaire, they were debriefed and excused.
Belief Questionnaire
Before any analyses were performed, the ratings made
by each judge on the 18 -item belief questionnaire were
18
added to arrive at each judge's belief accuracy score
(Mean score = 96.25, SD = 10.85), where higher scores
suggest more accurate beliefs about what behaviors are
associated with deception. A median split on the belief
accuracy scores resulted in 34 judges being assigned to
the low (inaccurate) end of the scale, and 34 judges
being assigned to the high (accurate) end of the scale.
Results
Manipulation Check
Judges were asked on a 9 -point scale how much they
had attended to the video. As expected, judges assigned
to the high suspicion paid more attention to the clips (M
= 7.25) compared to judges in the low suspicion condition
(M = 6.33), F ( 1 , 40) = 4.03, p < .05. Furthermore,
neither judges' belief accuracy, F (1, 40) = .01, p =
n.s., nor the interaction between suspicion and belief
accuracy, F (1, 40) = 1.80, p = n.s., affected judges'
responses on the manipulation check.
Detecting Deception
A 2 (suspicion: high vs. low) x 2 (belief accuracy:
high vs. low) x 2 (target sex) x 2 (type of message:
honest vs. dishonest) MANOVA using all 3 dependent
variables measuring how honest the target person seemed
was performed. Two dependent variables were measured on
a continuous 9-point Likert scale, while the third
19
dependent variable was a forced-choice question, which
asked participants whether they thought the targets were
honest or dishonest. A response of "Honest" was coded as
a score of 1 and a response of "Dishonest" was scored as
0. Therefore, the mean scores on this dependent variable
represents the proportion of targets judged to be honest.
Furthermore, the first two factors were between subjects,
while the latter two were within subjects.
The results of the multivariate analyses revealed a
significant effect for the type of message main effect,
where, in general, people were able to distinguish
between honest and dishonest messages, F(3, 62) = 19.86,
P < .001 (r) 2 = .49). This effect was significant in all
three univariate analyses. Judges rated the target
persons who were honest significantly more truthful (M =
5.91) than target persons who were dishonest (M = 5.52,),
F ( 1 , 64) = 17.91, p < .001 (r|
2
= .22) . Similarly, judges
thought that honest targets actually believed in their
arguments more (M = 5.78) than dishonest targets (M =
5.21), F ( 1 , 64) = 52.46 p < .001 (T| 2 = .45). Judges also
correctly identified targets that were honest (M = .66)
from targets that were dishonest (M = .56), F(l, 64) =
35.92, p < .001 (T|
2
= .36) .
The MANOVA on the theoretically meaningful
interaction of suspicion, belief accuracy, and type of
20
message was marginally significant, F(3, 62) 2.02, p <
• 15 (T| 2 =
. 36) . Although the multivariate analysis was
not significant, all three univariate analyses were
significant and in the predicted direction.
Table 1. The effects of suspicion, belief accuracy andtype of message on ratings of (a) truthfulness, (b)belief in arguments, and (c) honesty/dishonesty.
Dependent
Measure
Suspicion Belief
Accuracy
Type of
message
Mean
Truthfulness Low Low Honest 6 . 071 a
Dishonest 5 . 790 a
High Honest 5.602 a
Dishonest 5.466 a
High Low Honest 5 .691 a
Dishonest 5.496 a
High Honest 6 . 107 b
Dishonest 5.484 a
Believes in
the arguments
Low Low Honest 5 . 871 a
Dishonest 5.415 a
High Honest 5.431 a
Dishonest 5 . 046 a
High Low Honest 5 .595 a
Dishonest 5.221 a
High Honest 6 . 127 D
Dishonest 5 .235 a
Honest or
Dishonest
Low Low Honest .670 a
Dishonest . 575 a
High Honest . 631 a
Dishonest . 569 a
High Low Honest .618 a
Dishonest . 549 a
High Honest .728 D
Dishonest . 528 a
Note
.
Statistically significant (p < .01) mean
differences in the post-hoc Tukey WSD analyses
represented by different superscripts. Post-hoc analyses
were conducted within honest and dishonest types of
messages
.
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a significant difference
The univariate analyses showed
in the truthful
-untruthful question, F(l, 64) = 3.86, p <
• 05 (r| 2 =
.06), a significant difference in the question
concerning whether targets actually believed in their
arguments, F(l, 64) = 4.09, p < .05 (r| 2 = .06). Finally,
the three-way interaction on the third dependent variable
was significant, F(l,64) = 5.37, p < .05 (r| 2 = .08) . All
three of these analyses showed that people who were
suspicious and had accurate beliefs were significantly
better at detecting deception than any other experimental
group
.
Sex Differences
The multivariate analyses yielded a significant
target sex x type of message interactions, F(3, 62) =
7.06, p < .001 (r|
2
= .26) . Univariate analyses with each
of the dependent variables were significant. Judges
rated "honest" women as more truthful (M = 6.00) than
"dishonest" women (M = 5.4), while there was little
difference in judges' ratings of men who were honest (M =
5.73) and dishonest (M = 5.71), F(l, 64) = 17.70, p <
.001 (r| 2 = .22) . When judges were asked whether they
thought the targets actually believed in the arguments
they were presenting, the same pattern emerged, F(l, 64)
= 19.49, p < .001 (T|
2
= .23). Judges thought that women
22
who were being honest actually believed in their
arguments (M = 5.92) compared to women who were dishonest
(M - 5.07)
,
while judges' ratings for men were very
similar regardless of whether they were being honest (M =
5.59) or dishonest (M = 5.39). Judges also correctly
identified honest female targets (M = .70) from dishonest
women (M = .53), but judges did not significantly
differentiate between honest (M = .62) and dishonest (M =
.58) male targets in the forced-choice dependent
variable, F(l, 64) = 16.30, p < .001 (r| 2 = .20). These
findings show that lies told by women were detected more
easily than lies told by men.
Finally, a 4-way interaction between target sex,
suspicion, belief group, and type of message was observed
in the forced-choice question, F(3, 62) = 3.84, p < .05
(r| 2 = .16) . Although the multivariate analysis was
significant, the only ANOVA that revealed a significant
difference was the analysis consisting of the forced-
choice question, F(l, 64) = 3.74, p < .05 (r|
2
= .06).
This interaction revealed that the theoretically
significant 3-way interaction between suspicion, belief
group, and type of message was qualified by the sex of
the target
.
For male targets, the pattern of results mirrored
the 3 -way interaction. Judges in the low suspicion
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condition could not differentiate between honest and
dishonest male targets, while judges were significantly
more accurate at detecting male targets when they were
highly suspicious and had accurate beliefs. For female
targets, there was little difference between judges in
the four groups (high suspicion-high belief accuracy;
high suspicion-low belief accuracy; low suspicion-high
belief accuracy; low suspicion- low belief accuracy)
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Figure 1. Proportion of targets rated as honest as a
function of belief accuracy, suspicion, type of message,
and sex of the target person. Different superscripts
represent statistically significant differences in the
post-hoc Tukey test (p < .01).
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Discussion
This study found that people are able to
distinguish, to some degree, dishonest messages from
honest messages. The analysis of the effects of
suspicion and belief accuracy suggests that the most
accurate judges of deception are those people who have
accurate beliefs, but this only occurs when those beliefs
are activated. Finally, a gender difference was found,
where lies told by target women were more easily detected
than lies told by target men.
The results of this study provide initial evidence
regarding the role that activated beliefs have on the
accuracy of detecting deception. It was hypothesized
that a person's beliefs about what behaviors are
associated with deception would influence the accuracy of
that person's assessment of deception only if those
beliefs were activated. In other words, the best lie
detectors are not only those people who have accurate
beliefs about what behaviors they should attend to, but
they should also be able to use those beliefs when it is
appropriate. In this study, the most accurate judges in
detecting deception were those who had accurate beliefs
and were suspicious, especially when they were judging
male targets.
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The results of this study shed new light on a
problem encountered in deception detection research.
Various attempts have been made to teach judges to become
better lie detectors (Zuckerman, Koestner, & Alton,
1984) . Usually this involves showing a videotaped
interview of a person being honest and dishonest and
pointing out behaviors indicative of deception, or simply
identifying in which fragment the person was honest or
dishonest. Afterwards, judges are shown a video with
many target persons who are either honest or dishonest,
and included with these target persons is the target
person used in instructing the judges. The findings of
these studies show that training procedures, in general,
show an increase in accuracy in the part of the judges,
but most of this increase is due to the judges being
exceptionally accurate when they rate the target person
used in their instruction.
The results of the present study suggest that
trained participants have accurate beliefs, but those
beliefs were not sufficiently activated with all target
persons. However, when the instructional target person
appears on tape, the judges become extremely suspicious
and use the accurate beliefs they have at their disposal
to make accurate distinctions between when the target
person was honest and when he or she was dishonest.
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Another effect found in this study was the gender by
type of message interaction, where lies told by women
were more easily detected than lies told by men. DePaulo
and colleagues suggest that women may have a higher
motivation to make a good impression than men, which may
make them more susceptible to displaying certain
nonverbal behaviors that judges might use to detect
deception (DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter, 1985) .
Although the results of this study suggest that
accurate beliefs do, in some cases, lead to better
accuracy, it is important to point out some limitations.
First, the belief scale was constructed from previous
research and may not reflect the accuracy of beliefs
concerning behaviors associated with deception in the
specific population of target persons being studied.
Given that the scale was a useful way to distinguish
between people who had accurate and inaccurate beliefs, a
more context - specif ic scale may make the effect found
stronger
.
Second, it should be kept in mind that the type of
deception being investigated is of a very specific kind,
deception about a person's attitude. It is possible that
people lie in different ways depending on the domain, and
that when people lie about attitudes, they display
different nonverbal behaviors than when they lie about
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feelings. Study III and IV will investigate other types
of deception (Study III — what targets have in their
possession; Study IV — events in the targets' lives)
.
In conclusion, this study provides initial evidence
for the hypothesis that accurate beliefs about what
behaviors indicate deception are an important determinant
in a person's accuracy in detecting deception, but only
when those beliefs are activated. Presumably, suspicion
activated the beliefs that people had about what are the
appropriate cues associated with deception, and
therefore, more accurate beliefs led to more accurate
detection of deception.
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CHAPTER III
STUDY II: A DECEPTION DETECTION BELIEF SCALE
Overview
The results of Study I suggest that a belief
accuracy scale may be able to distinguish between people
who are good and bad detectors of deception. On the
basis of these findings, it seemed reasonable to
investigate further the properties of the scale.
Because each item of the scale is designed to
measure belief accuracy concerning a specific behavior
and the overall score reflects an overall accuracy score,
it was expected that the items would not necessarily be
highly correlated with each other. For example, an
accurate belief about whether people blink their eyes
more when deceiving is not necessarily related or
affected by an accurate or inaccurate belief concerning
deceivers' extent of smiling.
The analysis of these data also investigated whether
men have different beliefs than women and whether men and
women's belief accuracy differs. A factor analysis was
also performed in order to identify underlying variables
within the scale.
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Method
Participants and Procedure
Eight -hundred and ninety-one undergraduate
psychology students completed a battery of tests in
groups of 5 to 100 participants. Included in this
battery was the dichotomous (yes or no) version of the
Nonverbal Cues Belief Scale used in Study I as part of a
start of the semester screening procedure (see Appendix
B) . This scale contained 18 "yes" or "no" questions
about behaviors that people may or may not perform when
attempting to deceive someone else. Data from 222
participants (25 percent) were discarded because they
failed to complete all items on the scale. A total of
669 participants were used for the analyses.
Accuracy was again determined using the results from
previous meta-analyses (DePaulo et al
.
; 1985). A
person' s accuracy score was calculated as the average
score of each item on the scale, where 1 was a correct
answer and 0 was an incorrect answer. Mean accuracy
scores closer to 1 suggest high belief accuracy, while
scores closer to 0 suggest low belief accuracy. Mean
scores of .5 represent a belief accuracy rate at chance
level
.
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Results
Descriptive Statistics
Overall accuracy was distributed normally with a
mean of .54 and a standard deviation of .11. Mean
accuracy for each of the 18 items ranged from .23 for
Item 4 (talking slowly) to .82 for Item 10 (giving
irrelevant information)
. This suggests that people
generally have accurate beliefs about some behaviors that
people perform when attempting to deceive, but that there
are other behaviors about which people generally have
inaccurate beliefs.
Scale Characteristics
Mean belief accuracy (M = .54) was significantly
more accurate than chance level (.50), t (668) = 9.73, p
<.001. Although significantly different from chance, the
mean difference is quite small (mean difference = .04)
.
Further analysis using Chi-square tests of the individual
items reveal that participants were more accurate on some
items compared to others.
Specifically, people were most accurate in items
relating to eye contact, "ahs" and "urns" utterings,
irrelevant information, general responses, and people s
uses of "adaptors". People, in general, were very
inaccurate in items concerning deceivers' slow speech,
speech errors, and posture. Interestingly, the mean
32
scores for the only two items relating to facial
expressions (smiles and facial expressions) were at
chance levels.
Table 2: Description of beliefs, mean accuracy of
beliefs, and results of Chi-Square analyses (* p <.05;
** p < . 01)
.
Item Number Description Mean Chi-Square
(1)
1 Eye contact .79 218.6 **
2 Speech hesitation
. 80 249.3 **
3 Smiling .51
. 538
4 Talk slowly .24 619.0 **
5 Speech errors .28 124.5 **
6 Facial expression .41 . 07
7 Head movement .40 27.2 **
8 Posture .27 142.3 **
9 Negative statements .43 12.2 **
10 Irrelevant info. . 82 266.6 **
11 General responses .73 144.1 **
12 Self -references .59 22.5 **
13 Discrepancy .79 227.8 **
14 Pitch of voice .39 34.0 **
15 Blinking . 55 6.7 *
16 Shrug .46 3.6
17 "Adaptors" .79 223.2 *
18 Leg movement .39 31.8 *
An alpha reliability for the entire scale was also
calculated and found to be quite low ((X = -.01, p =
n.s.) . This unusually low reliability is not surprising
because the 18 scale items were not expected to be highly
correlated with each other. Each item measures a
person's belief accuracy for a specific behavior, and a
belief on one behavior did not predict the belief on
another behavior, producing the low alpha reliability.
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A principal components factor analysis with
quartimax rotation was performed on the 18 scale items.
From this analysis, three factors emerged. Factor 1
consisted of items 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 16, and 18. Because
all these items relate to nonverbal behaviors, this
factor was named "Nonverbal Belief Accuracy"
. Factor 2
consisted of items 2, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, and 13, as they
are all verbal/ paralinguist ic behaviors, this factor was
named "Verbal/Paralinguistic Belief Accuracy" . Finally,
factor 3 consisted of items 12 (self -reference)
,
14
(pitch increase)
,
15 (eye blinking)
,
and 17 (adaptors)
.
There is no distinct pattern to this factor, leading it
to be called the "Miscellaneous" factor. The three
factors jointly account for 40% of the variance.
Table 3: Three distinct factors with mean belief
accuracy, standard deviation, and t values of one-sample
t-test with .5 set as chance level. (** p < .01).
Factor Eigenvalue Mean SD t (668)
Nonverbal
Behavior Cues 2.45 .47 .25 -2.68 **
Verbal /
Paralinguistic
Cues
2 .31 . 58 . 17 12.25 **
Miscellaneous
Cues 2 . 19 .58 .27 7.62
**
In general, people's accuracy was better than chance
in the beliefs about behaviors of deceivers measured m
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the Verbal /Paralingui stic and Miscellaneous factors.
These differences were significantly different from
chance on both factors, t (668) = 12.25, £ < .001
(Verbal/Paralinguistic)
,
and t (668) = 7.62, p < .001
(Miscellaneous)
. On the other hand, people's accuracy in
the Nonverbal Behavior factor was below chance level, t
(668) = -2.68, p < .01.
Group Differences in Accuracy
One-way ANOVA's were conducted to test whether the
belief accuracy of men and women differed. In these
analyses, 589 participants were included because there
was no data on the sex of eighty participants. There was
no overall belief accuracy difference between men (M =
.53) and women (M = .53), F (1, 587) = .31, p = n.s.
Although there was no significant difference in the
overall accuracy, men had more accurate beliefs than
women in the Nonverbal Behavior factor (M = .49 and M =
.43, respectively), F (1, 587) = 6.12, p < .05. Men's
average belief accuracy was at chance level, while
women's belief accuracy was below chance level. Men and
women also differed in the Miscellaneous factor, where
women (M = .59) had more accurate beliefs than men (M =
.51), F (1, 587) = 12.59, p < .001.
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Discussion
Overall, people seemed to have somewhat accurate
beliefs about the behaviors that predict deception,
albeit the magnitude of the measured accuracy was quite
low. Alpha reliability of the scale was very low, but
this result was to be expected because each item measures
accuracy for a specific behavior, and a belief about one
deceptive behavior might not affect a person's belief
about another behavior.
A factor analysis revealed three distinct factors,
the first two of which correspond to distinct categories:
Nonverbal cues and Verbal/Paralinguistic cues. People
were most accurate with regards to Verbal/Paralinguistic
cues and their accuracy on Nonverbal cues was below
chance level. Men were more accurate in their beliefs
about Nonverbal cues, but both men and women were at or
below chance level. Furthermore, women were more
accurate in the Miscellaneous factor and men and women'
s
belief accuracy did not differ in the
Verbal/Paralinguistic factor.
In conclusion, the scale attributes suggest that
people's beliefs about the cues that predict deception
are not very accurate, especially when concerned with
beliefs about the nonverbal cues that predict deception.
The results of these analyses give us a greater
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understanding of the attributes of the scale being used.
In the following studies, sub-scales consisting of the
Nonverbal Behavior and Verbal/Paralinguistic Factors may
help in understanding the processes involved in detecting
deception and what types of cues people attend to when
attempting to detect deception.
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CHAPTER IV
STUDY III: DETECTING DECEPTION ON AIRLINE PASSENGERS
Overview
The results of Study I suggest that judges who have
accurate beliefs about the cues that predict deception
are better at detecting deception, but only when they are
highly suspicious of the target persons. The target
persons used for Study I were first and second year
undergraduate students. In order to generalize the
findings, target persons for Study III included a more
representative sample of the general population, as well
as a more ecologically valid situation.
Participants acting as judges viewed videotaped
fragments of actual airline passengers attempting to
carry contraband past an experimenter and were asked to
identify those passengers who they believed were carrying
contraband. As in Study I, suspicion was manipulated via
instructions. In addition, judges were given the
Nonverbal Cue Belief Scale used in Study II in order to
measure their accuracy in the beliefs about the
behavioral cues that predict deception. This belief
questionnaire consisted of the 18 items previously used
in the forced-choice scale in Study II (see Appendix B)
.
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The basic design of the study is a 2 (suspicion:
high vs. low) x 2 (belief accuracy: high vs. low) x 2
(contraband: yes vs. no), with the last factor within
subjects. The dependent variables were the judges'
ratings on the truthfulness questions for each fragment.
Method
Participants
Twenty-eight passengers (14 females and 16 males)
waiting for flights at a large international United
States airport were asked to volunteer to participate
(see Appendix C for letter of cooperation)
. The
passengers who volunteered were told that they would
receive up to $30 for their participation in a Customs
Agency training video. The sample was ethnically diverse
with 14 Anglo-Americans, 8 Latinos, 3 French-Canadians
,
3
African-Americans, 1 Portuguese and 1 Israeli.
Undergraduate college student participants (judges)
watched and judged the video samples of the airline
passengers
.
Passenger Recording Procedure
Individual mock customs interviews were held, with
volunteer passengers being told that videos were being
made to test and train customs agents. One experimenter
acted as the customs agent performing the interview,
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which took place next to an airline gate, and a second
experimenter prepared the passengers for the interview.
Passengers were randomly chosen to be in the
contraband condition, where they attempted to pass a
briefcase with contraband, or in the no contraband
condition, where they attempted to pass a briefcase
without contraband. To increase motivation to remain
undetected, all passengers were given $30 at the
beginning of the session. However, they were told that
they would loose $15 if their briefcase was searched by
the second experimenter. When people attempt to carry
contraband into the country, they stand to loose the
contraband item and money in fines. Therefore, by giving
the passengers the money at the beginning of the session
and threatening to take away part of it if they were
searched, passengers' motivation would more closely match
the actual scenario people encounter when going through a
customs checkpoint. In reality, there was no attempt to
search any passenger. Consequently, every volunteer
received $30 compensation.
All passengers, regardless of the condition they
were assigned, were given an empty briefcase and various
travel items such as a book, sweater, airline tickets, a
daily planner and a gift-box. Experimenter 1 named and
handed each item to the passenger in order for the
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passenger to place the item inside the briefcase. The
gift-box was always the last item handed to the
passenger. For passengers chosen to pass contraband, the
experimenter opened the gift-box to reveal six cigars.
Passengers were told that these were illegal Cuban cigars
that they would attempt to pass through Customs.
After the passengers placed all the items in the
briefcase, the experimenter instructed them to answer
truthfully any question that the customs agent
(experimenter 2) asked, except when it referred to the
contraband item, in which case they should deny having
that item in their possession and that there were
chocolates inside the gift-box. Their goal, therefore,
was to avoid experimenter 2 from opening the gift-box
hiding the cigars.
For passengers assigned to not pass contraband,
experimenter 1 also named and handed the passengers each
item, including a gift-box, which the experimenter opened
to reveal the chocolates that were inside. The
experimenter instructed these passengers to answer
truthfully any question asked by the customs agent
(experimenter 2)
.
Each interview lasted between 3 to 5 minutes and
included various questions regarding the passengers'
travel and whether they were carrying any contraband.
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Specifically, experimenter 2 asked each passenger what
was inside the bag, asked them to open the bag, and asked
what was inside the gift-box. These questions were
designed to closely mirror the actual questions asked by
customs agents at airports, and to force passengers in
the contraband condition to tell lies of omission
(filing to mention that they had cigars in the
briefcase) and lies of commission (telling the
experimenter that there were chocolates in the gift-box
when there were actually cigars) . After each passenger
answered the questions, he or she was thanked and
debriefed
.
Portions of all interviews were edited onto a master
videotape, which consisted of 1-minute fragments of each
interview. All fragments were of the final minute of
conversation with experimenter 2, where the experimenter
asked what was in the briefcase, asked the passenger to
open the briefcase, and asked what was in the gift-box.
Half the fragments were of passengers asked to pass
contraband (8 male and 7 female passengers) , and the
other half of the passengers not asked to pass
contraband (8 male and 7 female passengers) . One of the
passengers did not follow instructions, and therefore his
video was not used.
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Interview Viewing Procedure
In Part II of the study, groups of 2-10
undergraduate students viewed the tape created from the
passenger interviews
. They were given written
instructions in which they were told to watch a video and
answer a variety of questions regarding whether the
person on the video fragment was being deceitful, and
whether the person should be searched for contraband.
Furthermore, a suspicion manipulation, similar to that
used in Study I was introduced in the written
instructions
.
Similar to Study I, the suspicion manipulation was a
manipulation of the expected number of passengers that
were engaging in deception. The instructions for the
high-suspicion condition stated that many of the people
on the tape were carrying contraband. In the low-
suspicion condition, the instructions stated that only
some of the people on the tape were carrying contraband.
After all the judges read the instructions, the
experimenter began the videotape of the passengers
recorded in Part I. After viewing each fragment, judges
answered questions designed to measure how honest or
dishonest the passenger on the tape seemed to them (see
Appendix A) . After viewing all fragments, judges were
debriefed and excused.
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Results
Manipulation Check
At the end of the session, all judges were asked
what percent of the passengers did they think where
attempting to carry contraband. As expected, judges
assigned to the high suspicion condition thought that a
percent of the passengers were attempting to carry
contraband (M = 40.7%) compared to judges in the low
suspicion condition (M = 24.5%), F(l, 74) = 7.26, p <
.01. Furthermore, neither judges' belief accuracy, F (1,
74) = .55, p = n.s., nor the interaction between
suspicion and belief accuracy, F (1, 74) = 1.16, p =
n.s., affected judges' responses on the manipulation
check
.
Detecting Passenger Deception
A 2 (suspicion: high vs. low) x 2 (belief accuracy:
high vs. low) x 2 (target sex) x 2 (contraband: yes vs.
no) multivariate analysis of variance was performed on
the data. The two continuous variables were measured on
a 9-point scale. As in previous studies, judges were, in
general, able to detect deception, F (3, 73) = 12.37, p <
.001 (T| 2 = .34). Judges rated targets carrying
contraband as less truthful (M = 5.0) than those target
persons not carrying contraband (M = 5.3), F (1, 75) =
36.92, p < .001 (T)
2
= .33). Judges also were accurate
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when asked which targets they thought were carrying
contraband (M = 2.93 in the no-contraband condition, and
M = 3.23 in the contraband condition), F (1, 75 ) = 29.02,
p < .001 (r) = .28) . Judges were also accurate in
distinguishing between people carrying contraband and
those who were not carrying contraband when asked to
indicate whether they would stop the passenger in order
to search for contraband, F (1, 75) = 16.27, p < .001 (if
= .18) . Judges indicated that they would search more of
the passengers in the contraband condition (M = .38) than
passengers in the no-contraband condition (M = .30) .
To test the hypothesis that people with accurate
beliefs are better at detecting deception, especially
when they are highly suspicious, a 3 -way interaction
between suspicion level, belief accuracy, and type of
message was tested. This test revealed no significant
difference between the groups, F (3, 73) = 1.62, p = n.s.
This hypothesis was also tested with a multivariate
analysis using the 2 major scale components identified in
the factor analysis of Study II, but neither of the 3-way
interactions between the verbal component of the scale,
suspicion and type of message, or between the nonverbal
component, suspicion and type of message were
significant
.
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On the other hand, there was a marginally
significant multivariate difference in the 2-way
interaction between suspicion and type of message, F (3,
73) = 2.i2, p < .1 (r|
2
=
.08) . When suspicious, judges
rated honest targets as more truthful (M = 5.13) than
dishonest targets (M = 4.68)
,
but judges who were not
suspicious were not able to distinguish between honest (M
= 5.46) and dishonest targets (M = 5.26), F (1, 75) =
4.82, p < .05 (r) 2 = .06) . Suspicious judges were also
able to distinguish between honest (M = 3.16) and
dishonest (M = 3.57) targets compared to judges who were
not suspicious (Honest M = 2.74; Dishonest M = 2.95) by
identifying who was more likely to be carrying
contraband, F (1, 75) = 3.09, p < .1 (ij 2 = .04), and who
they would search for contraband, F (1, 75) = 4.91, p <
.05 (ij 2 = .06). Suspicious judges said that they would
be more likely to search dishonest targets for contraband
(M = .42) compared to honest targets (M = .32)
.
Judges
who were not suspicious were not able to correctly decide
whom they would search for contraband (honest M = .29 and
dishonest M = .32)
.
Perceptions of Deceptiveness
Besides effects relating to accuracy, judges
perceived certain targets as more deceptive than others
did. One interesting, although not unexpected result was
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a multivariate main effect for suspicion, F (3, 73 ) =
2.52, p < .06 (r| 2 = .09). Specifically, highly
suspicious judges rated targets as less truthful (M =
4.9) than judges in the low suspicion condition (M =
5.4)
,
F (1, 75) = 7.10, p < .01 ( r|
2
=
.09) . In addition,
suspicious judges rated targets as more likely to be
carrying contraband (M = 3.4) than judges in the low
suspicion condition (M = 2.8), F (1, 75) = 7.37, p < .01
(T| 2 =
. 09) .
Furthermore, a MANOVA revealed that men were seen as
less truthful, more likely to carry contraband and to be
searched than women, F (3, 73) = 20.29, p < .001 (r| 2 =
.46)
.
Judges rated men as less truthful (M = 5.0) than
women (M = 5.3), F (1, 75) = 28.00, p < .001 (if = .27).
Judges also found men more likely to be carrying
contraband (M = 3.3) than women (M = 2.9), F (1, 75) =
52.92, p < .001 (r)
2
= .41). Finally, judges indicated
that they would be more likely to search men (M = .40)
than women (M = .28), F (1, 75) = 41.84, p < .001 (T|
.36) .
This difference between male and female targets was
especially apparent for judges who were not suspicious, F
(3, 73) = 2.93, p < .05 (T)
2
= .11). Judges in the low
suspicion condition rated males as less truthful (M -
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5.1) than females (M = 5.6), while judges in the high
suspicion condition did not significantly differentiate
between male (M = 4.8) and female (M = 4.9) targets, F
(1, 75) = 8.79, p < .01 (T| 2 = .11). The same pattern
emerged when judges were asked the likelihood that the
target was carrying contraband, F (1, 75) = 5.57, £ < .05
(T| 2 = .07)
. Highly suspicious judges assigned the same
likelihood of carrying contraband to male (M = 3.5) and
female (M = 3.2) targets. On the other hand, judges in
the low suspicion condition rated male targets as more
likely to be carrying contraband (M = 3.1) than female
targets (M = 2.5).
48
Discussion
Although the test of the hypotheses did not show the
expected pattern, this study provides interesting data
concerning people's accuracy in detecting deception and
people s perception of deceptiveness in law enforcement
settings. The target persons used in this study were not
undergraduate students and the sample was ethnically
diverse
.
This study found that judges were, in general, able
to distinguish between people who were attempting to
deceive and people who were not attempting to deceive.
This is an important result because most of the studies
that investigate people's accuracy in detecting deception
have dealt with student samples as the target persons.
The study shows evidence that people, in general, can
detect deception at a better than chance level on non-
student samples.
The study also found that judges who were suspicious
were better able to detect deception compared to judges
who were not suspicious. This is an intriguing finding
given that previous research has not found a relationship
between suspicion level and deception detection accuracy
(e.g., Toris & DePaulo, 1985). One difference between
previous studies investigating suspicion and this study
are the target persons used. Previous studies have used
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student samples, which are younger and less ethnically
diverse than the sample used in this study. In addition,
the procedure used to video-record the deception has not
been used in studies investigating the effects of
suspicion on deception. This procedure differs from lab
procedures because it was performed at an airport and
participants were led to believe that the purpose of the
session was to make training videos for real customs
agents
.
The difference in procedure might have led target
persons to act in different ways when deceiving than
those suggested by previous meta-analyses. Moreover, a
diverse sample such as this sample might perform
different behaviors when deceiving than homogeneous
student samples represented in the meta-analysis (DePaulo
et al
. ,
1985) . If this were true, then the scale used in
this study would not be a good predictor of a person's
belief accuracy because the behaviors actually indicative
of deception for this sample would be unknown.
Furthermore, the factors mentioned above may have
also been related to the effect of suspicion on accuracy.
The hypothesis of this study is that when a person is
suspicious, the person will attend to the behaviors or
cues that he or she believes will predict deception. If,
in general, judges' beliefs about the cues that predict
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deception were accurate for this specific sample, then
suspicious judges would attend to the correct behaviors,
and make accurate assessments about the deceptiveness of
each target.
It is important to keep in mind that the belief
scale used in this study was a forced-choice
questionnaire. In Study I, the scale was continuous. A
continuous scale may have been a more precise way of
measuring the strength of the beliefs, where stronger
beliefs have a stronger impact on the overall accuracy
score
.
This study also showed that judges viewed men as
less truthful than women. Interestingly, suspicious
judges did not rate men or women as more or less
truthful, but unsuspicious judges did rate men as less
truthful than women. This might be due to judges who
were not suspicious relying on automatic stereotyping
processes
.
In conclusion, Study III did not find direct
evidence for the hypothesis that people with accurate
belief about the behaviors that predict deception are
better at detecting deception when those beliefs are
activated. Indirect evidence, such as the effect of
suspicion on accuracy, gives some support to the idea of
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beliefs driving accuracy. Study IV was designed to shed
light on the discrepancies between Study I and Study III.
CHAPTER V
STUDY IV: DETECTING DECEPTION IN A MOCK JURY TRIAL
Overview
Study IV was designed to test the generalizability
of the effect that suspicion has on accuracy. The idea
behind increased accuracy in detecting deception when a
person is suspicious is that suspicion activates the
beliefs people have about the cues that predict
deception. A motivation manipulation instead of a
suspicion manipulation was used in this study in order to
activate beliefs, and there was also an attempt to
manipulate people's beliefs concerning the behaviors that
people engage in when lying. The drawback to the
previous studies was that belief accuracy was a
correlational variable. This study attempted to
experimentally manipulate participants' beliefs.
Target persons were asked about an instance in which
they broke or did not break a law, and they were asked to
present their answers either honestly or dishonestly.
These answers were recorded and edited onto master tapes.
Participants then acted as jurors and viewed the
"depositions" of the target persons and answered a
variety of questions relating to how truthful their
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answers were. Before viewing the video fragments,
participants were given written instructions that
described behaviors that people perform while being
deceptive. The behaviors mentioned were either correct
or incorrect. In addition, the written instructions
contained an involvement manipulation. This manipulation
was intended to make the behaviors that were mentioned in
the instructions (correct or incorrect) more salient for
the participant.
It was hypothesized that participants who were
presented the correct behaviors would be better at
detecting deception than participants given the incorrect
behaviors, but only when they were highly involved.
Method
Participants
Twelve undergraduate students (6 females, 6 males)
were recruited as the target persons. For their
participation, the target persons received experimental
credit for their introductory psychology class.
Furthermore, undergraduate student participants acted as
the jurors in the case, and received experimental credit
for their participation. Participants acting as judges
were recruited from the sample of students used in Study
II
.
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Encoding Procedure
Target persons entered an experimental room and were
told that they would have to remember and talk about past
experiences and then answer questions about the behaviors
as they happened and as if the behaviors had not taken
place. Participants were first given a questionnaire,
which asked if they had been involved in a variety of
behaviors from traffic violations to drug use. Once the
participant completed the questionnaire, the experimenter
read the participant's responses and verified that the
participant had engaged in underage drinking and used
illicit drugs at least once. These would be the two
events that would be recorded, and would later be used as
stimulus material. These two events were chosen for two
reasons: (1) a large percentage of college students
admitted to having engaged in both these behaviors at
least once, and (2) the two behaviors were, in general,
at the opposite extremes in terms of how wrong the sample
viewed each of the behaviors. Underage drinking was seen
as a more benign activity (M = 3.80 on a 10-point scale)
than illegal drug use (M = 6.1) . By using both events
for the stimulus material, the perceived severity of the
behavior could be investigated as a factor affecting
deception detection accuracy.
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Two practice question and answer sessions took
place, where in one exchange the experimenter asked the
target person to remember one situation in which he or
she broke a traffic law and one situation in which he or
she had the opportunity to cheat on an exam but did not.
These two events were selected because, in pilot testing,
almost 100 percent of college students admitted to
committing traffic violations and having the opportunity
to cheat on a test but not doing so.
After the practice session, participants were asked
to remember the stimulus events, underage drinking and
drug use. The experimenter instructed the target persons
to imagine that they were being questioned by a lawyer
about a specific event. Half the participants answered
questions about a situation in which they used illegal
drugs, a situation in which they had the opportunity to
use illegal drugs but did not, a situation in which they
had an alcoholic drink while being underage, and a
situation in which they had the opportunity to have an
alcoholic drink while being underage but did not. The
other half of the participants were asked questions in
the reverse order, starting with the two underage
drinking events followed by the two drug use events.
For each of the two behaviors (drug use and underage
drinking)
,
participants were asked to write down a
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description of the events in question to help remind
themselves. Participant wrote a description for the
situations in which (1) the participants engaged in drug
use/underage drinking, and (2) the event where the
participant had the opportunity to engage in drug
use/underage drinking but did not do so. After writing
down a description of the event, the experimenter handed
the participant an envelope which instructed the
participant to answer the questions in one of four
different ways: (1) Describe the event in which you
consumed drugs/alcohol the way it happened; (2) Describe
the event in which you consumed drugs/alcohol as if it
had not happened; (3) Describe the event in which you had
the opportunity to consume drugs/alcohol but did not do
so, the way it happened; (4) Describe the event in which
you had the opportunity to consume drugs/alcohol but did
not do so, as if they had actually consumed
drugs/alcohol. This procedure meant that every
participant was truthful and lied about a situation in
which he or she consumed drugs and drank alcohol while
being underage, and a truth and a lie about a situation
in which he or she had the opportunity to consume drugs
or drink alcohol while underage, but did not do so.
After reading the instructions inside each envelope,
the experimenter would tell the participants "You have
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been accused of underage drinking/illegal drug use.
Please tell me, in your own words, what happened the day
m question." Participants would then describe the
situation as they were instructed in the envelope.
These recordings were then edited onto two tapes.
On both tapes, each target person appeared 4 times, twice
telling the truth and twice telling a lie. Two tapes
were made in order for targets not to appeared to be
talking about the same situation twice, therefore,
targets appear on each tape talking once about each of
the 4 situations: (1) when they engaged in drug use; (2)
when they had the opportunity to engage in drug use but
did not do so; (3) when they drank while underage; and
(4) when they had the opportunity to drink while
underage, but did not do so. Therefore, each tape had
48 fragments.
Judging Procedure
Sixty-five participants acted as "jurors" who
watched one of the two videotapes and tried to tell which
of the witnesses were lying about the incident. Before
viewing the tape, participants were given a list of
behaviors that are exhibited by people when they are
telling lies (see Appendix D) . This list consisted of
either correct behaviors (those behaviors that signal
deception) or incorrect behavior (those behaviors that do
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not signal deception) derived from previous meta-analyses
of cues that predict deception (e.g. DePaulo et al
. ,
1985) .
Written instructions manipulated the participant's
involvement, where some participants were told that the
experimenter was interested in people's accuracy in
detecting deception, and that it was important for them
to be as accurate as possible (high involvement
condition)
. Participants in the low involvement
condition were told that the experimenter was interested
in the process by which people decide whether a person is
being honest or dishonest, and that the experimenter was
interested in the way people attribute deception. After
viewing each of the 48 video fragments, the participants
answered three questions concerning the truthfulness of
each of the target persons (see Appendix A)
.
The basic design of the study was a 2 (involvement:
high vs. low) x 2 (primed cues: correct vs. incorrect) x
2 (target sex) x 2 (type of message: honest vs.
dishonest), with the last factor within subjects. Other
factors such as perceived severity of the behavior, and
whether the target person was talking about a situation
in which he or she engaged in a behavior or not were also
investigated. The dependent variables were the
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participant's ratings on the truthfulness questions for
each fragment (Appendix A)
.
Results
Manipulation Check
After viewing the tape, all participants were asked
a series of questions as manipulation checks.
Participants in the high and low involvement conditions
did not differ in the reported amount of effort, but did
differ in the percent of the target persons they thought
were being deceptive. Participants assigned to the high
involvement condition thought that a higher percent of
the target persons were attempting to deceive (M = 47.7%)
compared to judges in the low involvement condition (M =
35.9%), F ( 1 , 54) = 5.39, p < .05. Furthermore, no other
factor affected the responses on the manipulation checks.
Deception Detection Accuracy
A multivariate analysis of variance main effect for
type of message revealed that, in general, participants
were able to distinguish between targets being honest and
dishonest, F(3,58) = 3.04, p < .05 (ij
2
= .14).
Participants distinguished between honest and dishonest
targets when rating the likelihood of the target person
breaking the law (Honest M = 4.78; Dishonest M = 4.91),
F ( 1 , 6 0 ) = 5.22, p < .05 (T|
2
= .08). When asked whether
they thought the targets were being truthful about the
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incident, participants thought that a greater number of
honest targets were being honest (M = .60) compared to
the dishonest targets (M =
.55), F(l,60) = 10.68, p < .01
^ ~ *15)
.
Although not significant, the same pattern
appeared when participants rated honest targets as more
truthful (M = 4.55) than dishonest targets (M = 4.47),
F ( 1 , 6 0) = 2.05, p < .15 (if = .03).
The test of the hypothesis between primed behaviors,
involvement, and type of message did not reveal a
significant multivariate 3-way interaction, F(3,58) =
.811, p = n.s. (if = .04) . Furthermore, neither of the
three univariate analyses revealed any significant
differences
.
Interestingly, participants were better able to
distinguish between honest and dishonest targets
depending on the severity of the event they had engaged
in and whether the targets were being deceitful about a
situation in which they actually committed the infraction
compared to being deceitful about a situation in which
they had the opportunity to engage in the behavior but
did not do so.
The multivariate analysis revealed a significant 2-
way interaction between guilt and type of message,
F ( 3 , 58 ) = 100.94, p < .001 (if = .84). The univariate
analyses revealed that participants rated honest targets
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as more truthful than dishonest targets when the target
was actually guilty of the performing the behavior
(Honest M = 5.07; Dishonest M = 3.87) compared to when
the target person was deceiving about a situation in
which he or she as actually not guilty (Honest M = 4.03;
Dishonest M = 5.09), F(l,60) = 131.85, p < .001 (r| 2 =
.69) . This difference also appeared when participants
indicated whether they thought the person was telling the
truth about the incident (Guilty: Honest M = .73 and
Dishonest M = .40; Not Guilty: Honest M = .46 and
Dishonest M = .72),F(1,60) = 149.21, p < .001 (T| 2 = .71).
When rating the likelihood of the target person
breaking the law, the reverse pattern emerged where
participants distinguished between honest and dishonest
targets when the target was actually not guilty (Honest M
= 4.3; Dishonest M = 5.4) compared to when the target was
guilty (Honest M = 5.2; Dishonest M = 4.4), F(l,60) =
96.27, p < .001 (T|
2
= .62). These effects are probably
due to people's bias in believing what was being said by
the target person. This is especially evident in the
question concerning the likelihood that the person broke
the law, which has the reverse pattern of the other two
dependent variables. When the target person was guilty
and honest, and when the target was not guilty and
dishonest, the target was describing an event where the
62
target used drugs or drank while being underage,
therefore participants rated these fragments as high in
likelihood of breaking the law. On the other hand, when
the target was not guilty and honest, and guilty and
dishonest, the target persons were communicating that
they did not engage in drug use or underage drinking,
hence communicating a lower likelihood of committing a
transgression. Therefore, a target's guilt did not
affect a participant's ability to detect deception;
rather, the interaction reflects an inherent bias by the
participants to accept the story given by the target
persons as true.
On the other hand, the severity of the behavior had
an impact on the ability of the participants to detect
deception, F(3,58) = 3.01, p < .05 (rj 2 = .14). The
severity factor reflects the perception of the sample
that drug use is a more severe and "wrong" behavior than
underage drinking, which is widely accepted in the
college sample. Participants rated honest targets as
more honest (M = 4.76) than dishonest targets (M = 4.51)
in the low severity condition (underage drinking) . In
the high severity condition (drug use)
,
participants were
not able to make a distinction between honest (M = 4.34)
and dishonest (M = 4.43) target persons, F(l,60) = 8.99,
p < .01 (T|
2
= .13). Participants were also able to
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accurately identify the targets that were honest from the
targets that were dishonest when the targets were in the
low severity condition (Honest M = .64; Dishonest M =
.56). In the high severity condition, participants were
not able to distinguish between honest and dishonest
targets (Honest M = .55; Dishonest M =
.56), F(l,60) =
6.22, p < .01 (T| 2 = . 10) .
Although not significant, the pattern of results was
the same for the question concerning the likelihood of
the targets breaking the law. When in the low severity
condition honest targets were rated as less likely of
breaking the law (M = 4.65) than dishonest targets (M =
4.83) compared to the high severity condition (Honest M =
4.91; Dishonest M = 4.98), F(l,60) = .54, p = n.s (Tj 2 =
. 01) .
Finally, a multivariate 3 -way interaction between
target sex, severity and type of message was revealed,
F ( 3 , 54
)
= 7.13, p < .001 (r|
2
= .27). In the question
concerning the truthfulness of the target persons,
participants were better able to distinguish between
honest and dishonest targets when the target was female
and the behavior was low on severity compared to female
targets/high severity and male targets in general,
F ( 1 , 6 0 ) = 13.40, p < .001 (Tj
2
= .18).
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Figure 2: Mean truthfulness ratings as a function of
target sex, severity of transgression, and type of
message. Different superscripts represent
statistically significant differences in the post-
hoc Tukey test (p < .05)
.
The same pattern of results was found for the dependent
variable asking participants to indicate whether they
thought the targets were being honest or dishonest,
F(l,60) = 7.09, p < .01 (if = .11).
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Figure 3 : Mean truthfulness ratings as a function of
target sex, severity of transgression, and type of
message. Different superscripts represent
statistically significant differences in the post-
hoc Tukey test (p < .05)
.
Perceptions of Deceptiveness
A multivariate analysis revealed a main effect for
target sex, F(3,58) = 11.40, p < .001 (if = .37).
Participants rated male targets as more truthful (M =
4.76) than female targets (M = 4.27), F(l,60) = 33.19, p
< .001 (rj 2 = .36). Participants also identified a
greater number of males targets as honest (M = .64)
compared to female targets (M = .52) , F(l,60) = 26.95, p
< . 001 (if = . 31) .
This sex difference was qualified by a 2-way
interaction between target sex and primed cues, F(3,58) -
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4.96, p < .01 (T| - .20) . When asked how truthful the
target persons seemed, participants rated male targets as
more truthful than female targets, especially when the
instructions contained correct cues that predict
deception, F(l,60) = 4.62, p < .05 (r| 2 = .07).
Target Person Sex
Figure 4: Mean truthfulness ratings as a function of
target sex and accuracy of primed cues. Different
superscripts represent statistically significant
differences in the post-hoc Tukey test (p < .05)
.
The same pattern was revealed when the participants were
asked which targets they thought were being honest about
the incident, F(l,60) = 10.68, p < .01 (rj
2
= .15),
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Figure 5: Mean proportion of targets rated as
"Honest" as a function of target sex and accuracy of
primed cues. Different superscripts represent
statistically significant differences in the post-
hoc Tukey test (p < .05)
.
When asked the likelihood that the target person had
broken the law, women were rated as more likely to have
broken the law compared to men, but only when
participants had been given accurate cues that predict
deception, F(l,60) = 10.68, p < .01 (T| 2 = .15).
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Target Person Sex
Figure 6: Rated likelihood that the target person
broke the law as a function of target sex and
accuracy of primed cues. Different superscripts
represent statistically significant differences in
the post-hoc Tukey test (p < .05) .
Finally, a multivariate main effect for severity was
found, F ( 3 , 5 8 ) = 7.02, p < .001 (T|
2
= .27). When target
persons were shown describing a situation low on severity
(underage drinking) participants rated them as being more
truthful (M = 4.64) than target persons describing a high
severity situation (drug consumption; M = 4.38), F(l,60)
= 16.67, p < .001 (T)
2
= .22). Targets in the high
severity condition were rated as more likely to have
broken the law (M = 4.95) compared to targets in the low
severity condition (M = 4.74), F(l,60) = 6.50, p < .01
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(tj
.10) . Participants also identified more targets in
the low severity condition as honest (M = .60) than
targets in the high severity condition (M =
.55), F(l,60)
= 6.85, p < .01 (T| 2 = . 10) .
Controlling for Belief Accuracy
This study attempted to manipulate the beliefs
participants have by presenting either a list of cues
that actually predict deception or a list of cues that do
not predict deception. As seen in the previous section,
the analyses showed that the manipulation of involvement
and primed cues had no significant effect on a
participant's accuracy in detecting deception. It is
possible that belief accuracy still had an effect on
deception detection accuracy. Two sets of post-hoc
analyses were performed to get a better understanding
about the process of detecting deception and the role
that belief accuracy may play.
Correlational tests were performed on the belief
accuracy variable and the ratings of truthfulness.
Because the two continuous dependent variables measuring
truthfulness were significantly correlated, r (60) = +
.34, the two variables were combined into one variable in
order to run the correlation analysis. It was found that
the dependent variables were positively correlated with
people's belief accuracy score measured during the
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initial, pre-experiment screening, r (60) = +
.29, p <
.05. Furthermore, when calculating the correlation with
only the participants in the low involvement condition,
the magnitude of the correlation drops r (32) = + .18, p
= n.s. On the other hand, when only participants in the
high involvement condition are used, the magnitude of the
correlation increases r(28) = + .45, p < .01. These
results suggest that people rely on the beliefs they hold
when making attribution of deceptiveness, especially when
they are highly involved, and that the manipulation was
not strong enough.
Given the significance of the correlations, the
results found on the main analyses were reanalyzed on a
MANCOVA analysis controlling for a participant's belief
accuracy. When holding participant's prior belief
accuracy score constant, many of the tests where there
was a significant difference in the main analyses were
not significant. Specifically, the main effect for type
of message, which tested participants' ability to detect
deception across all conditions, and the interaction
between severity and type of message, were not
significant when holding prior beliefs constant.
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Table 4: Multivariate analyses of variance and covariance
F scores, proportion of variance accounted for (r| 2 ) anddifference is variance accounted for when controlling forbelief accuracy. (* p < .05; ** p < .01).
MANOVA MANOVA MANCOVA MANCOVA
n
2
Effect F ( 3 , 58
)
Tl
2 F(3, 53)
Tl
2
dif ferenc
e
Type of Message 3 . 04* . 14 1 . 57 . 08
. 06
Guilt x Type of
Message 100 . 9** . 84 61.8** .78
. 06
Severity x Type
of Message 3
.
01 *
. 14 1 . 83 .09 . 05
Sex x Severity x
Type of Message 7 . 13** . 27 3 . 56* . 17 . 10
Sex 11.4** .37 5 . 18** .23 . 14
Severity 7.02** .27 4
.
01 * . 18 . 09
Sex x Primed
Cues 4 . 96* .20 .75 . 04 . 16
Furthermore, effect size (T| 2 ) for all tests
measuring deception detection accuracy were lower when
participant's belief accuracy score was controlled for.
As Table 4 shows, belief accuracy score seems to mediate
the relationship between a person's ratings of
(j0Q0pt. iveness and whether the target is being honest or
dishonest. According to Baron and Kenny (1986) and Judd
72
and Kenny (1981), there are four steps to establish
mediation: (1) the initial variable must be correlated
with the outcome variable; (2) the initial variable must
be correlated with the mediator variable; (3) the
mediator variable must be correlated with the outcome
variable; and (4) controlling for the mediator variable,
the relationship between the initial variable and the
outcome variable must disappear. Because the
relationship investigated here is a within-subjects
relationship, a full mediation analysis cannot be
performed
.
The ad-hoc mediation analysis presented in Table 4
uses the eta squared (T| 2 ) from the MANOVA and MANCOVA
performed on the data. Although rj 2 is not the statistic
of choice for mediation analyses, it is a measure of the
proportion of the total variability in the dependent
variable accounted for by the independent variable.
Therefore, it is conceptually similar to the correlation
coefficient (r)
,
which is the square root of the R2 a
measure of variance accounted for by the regression
model. Another difference between this mediation test
and mediation tests described by Baron and Kenny (1986)
is that the relationship between the initial variable
(type of message) and the mediation variable (belief
accuracy) cannot be determined.
73
Discussion
The main test of the hypothesis in this study did
not find a relationship between the cues that people
believe should predict deception, involvement, and
accuracy in detecting deception. Nevertheless, this
study did find that people, in general, could distinguish
between honest and dishonest target persons, and the
correlations and the ad-hoc mediation analysis suggests
that there is a relationship between belief accuracy and
accuracy in detecting deception.
Furthermore, this study found that the severity of
the transgression affects the ease with which people can
detect deception. In this study, it was easier to detect
deception when the target person was talking about an
infringement that is perceived as relatively minor
(underage drinking) compared to a relatively severe
infringement (drug use)
.
Previous studies have not
investigated this factor as a moderator of the ability to
detect deception, although it shares some similarities
with the motivational impairment effect proposed by
DePaulo and colleagues (DePaulo et al .
,
1988; DePaulo &
Kirkendol, 1988).
The motivational impairment hypothesis suggests that
lies told by targets that are highly motivated to deceive
effectively are easier to detect by judges than lies told
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by target persons who are not highly motivated to deceive
effectively. Since DePaulo's original study, other
researchers have replicated the findings (e.g., Forrest
and Feldman, 2000) . Although there are similarities, the
results of the present study show the reverse pattern,
where lies of the "highly motivated" target (high
severity) were more difficult to detect than lies of the
"low motivation" (low severity) target. This leads to
the conclusion that although similar, severity of
transgression and motivation not to get caught in a lie
are not representations of the same construct. It is
possible that people are more comfortable speaking about
underage drinking because it is a behavior that the
majority of the target's peers engage in. Because they
are comfortable with the topic, they might not be
motivated to mask their behaviors when deceiving,
thereby, making their deceptions easier to detect.
Another explanation for the relationship between
severity and accuracy at detecting deception is that when
speaking about drug use, which has a negative stigma
attached to it, targets' anxiety level might be more
elevated than when talking about underage drinking. This
increase in anxiety level may manifest itself in certain
behaviors that are correlated with both anxiety and
deception. Therefore, the increased level of anxiety
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caused by the topic of conversation may be interpreted by
the persons judging the tapes as signs of deception.
Finally, in this study men were rated as more
truthful than women, regardless of whether they were
deceiving or not. This is an interesting finding because
when there is a relationship between the sex of the
target and truthfulness ratings, there is usually a bias
favoring women. The difference in ratings was especially
apparent with those "jurors" who were given a list of
behaviors that are predictive of deception. It is
possible that because women engage in a wider variety of
nonverbal behaviors compared to men (Hall, 1984; Exline,
1963), women were rated as less truthful by the
participants when they were presented with the list of
behaviors that predict deception. Overall, men may
perform behaviors such as increased facial expressions,
which is associated with deception, to a lesser extent
than women. Therefore, by priming the participants to
look for specific behaviors, they might conclude that the
women shown are less truthful than the men shown.
In conclusion, this study found some interesting
effects although the main analyses did not show any
conclusive evidence supporting the hypothesis that the
beliefs people hold concerning the behaviors that predict
deception are associated with how accurate those people
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detecting deception. It is possible that the
"training" method used for this study was not
sufficiently strong to cause even a temporary change in
the beliefs people hold concerning the behaviors that
predict deception. Indirect evidence stemming from the
results of the MANCOVA where belief accuracy was
controlled for suggests that belief accuracy does have a
role to play in a person's ability to detect deception.
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CHAPTER VI
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Considering the possible applications of research on
deception detection, it is important to understand the
factors that may influence a person's ability to be an
accurate detector of deception. The hypotheses presented
in this dissertation suggest that a combination of
beliefs, motivation, and social contexts can affect
people's accuracy in detecting deception. Specifically,
the studies compared two models describing the process by
which people arrive at a decision as to who is deceiving
and who is being truthful. One model (The Cognitive
Model) suggests that the beliefs people hold about the
cues that predict deception are directly responsible for
how people attribute deceptiveness. The second model
(the social cognitive model) suggests that the beliefs
people hold affect attributions of deceptiveness, but
only when those beliefs are activated. All three
experimental studies tested these two hypotheses
.
In Study I, direct evidence for the social cognitive
model was found, where judges who were suspicious and had
accurate beliefs about the cues that predict deception
were able to detect deception more accurately than
people
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in other conditions. The results of Study I suggest that
when people are suspicious, they attend more to the cues
they believe will predict deception. If a suspicious
person has accurate beliefs, then he or she is very
accurate in detecting deception. On the other hand, when
people had inaccurate beliefs and were suspicious, they
attended to the wrong cues, and therefore were not be
able to accurately distinguish between honest and
dishonest target persons.
In Study II, the belief scale used in Study I was
modified and administered to 669 undergraduate students
in order to investigate the properties of the scale. It
was found that the items on the scale were not internally
correlated, which was to be expected because the items
measure individual beliefs that are not necessarily
related to each other or affected by each other. The
overall accuracy of people concerning the beliefs about
cues that predict deception was above chance level, but
the magnitude of the effect was not impressive. It was
also found that people tend to have accurate beliefs
about verbal cues, while holding inaccurate beliefs about
nonverbal cues. Men's accuracy of beliefs tended to be
around chance level, while women were relatively quite
accurate in terms of verbal cues, while being inaccurate
in terms of nonverbal cues. Finally, the scale mirrored
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recent studies (e.g., Vrij & Semin, 1996) that have
investigated people's beliefs about the cues that predict
deception
.
Study III did not find any direct evidence for the
role that beliefs may have on judge's accuracy in
detecting deception. On the other hand, suspicion
increased judge's ability to detect deception. Some
studies on suspicion and involvement have interpreted any
effects due to judge's involvement or suspicion as
affecting the target person's behaviors, therefore making
deceit easier or more difficult to detect (Burgoon et
al
. ,
1999; Toris & DePaulo, 1985). Because judges and
targets did not have a face-to-face interaction in this
study, these results cannot be explained with this
interpersonal interaction model. This points to
suspicion changing the way people view and process
information when making a decision about the
deceptiveness of a target person.
There are two possible reasons for this effect of
suspicion on accuracy, which together give indirect
evidence for the hypothesis that beliefs about cues are
related to deception detection accuracy. First, studies
find that suspicious judges pay more attention to the
cues that predict deception (Zuckerman et al . , 1982;
DePaulo, et al . , 1982). Second, the target persons m
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Study II were an older, more diverse sample than college
students, and they engaged in a type of deceptive
behavior (being questioned by a "law enforcement
) and context (outside the laboratory) rarely
investigated in social psychological studies. It is
possible that the cues exhibited by this group when
deceiving were different from those measured in the
belief scale. If this were true, the belief scale would
not have been an accurate measure of judge's beliefs
about the cues that predict deception in this specific
case. Taken together, these two explanations point to
suspicious people attending to an array of cues that were
probably not measured correctly or at all by the belief
accuracy scale.
Study IV attempted to teach judges either correct or
incorrect beliefs about the cues that predict deception.
The hypothesis that belief cues are associated with
accuracy in detecting deception did not receive any
direct support. It is possible that the belief
manipulation was not strong enough to elicit a change in
beliefs. However, the results of this study do suggest
that belief cues mediate judge's accuracy when attempting
to detect deception. Judge's belief accuracy measured in
a pre-screen was related to judges' ratings of the target
person's truthfulness. The relationship between belief
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accuracy and truthfulness ratings was especially strong
when the judge was highly involved in the task. These
post-hoc tests show a pattern of evidence that indicate
the possible role that beliefs about cues that predict
deception have on a person's accuracy at detecting
deception
.
The results of these studies have helped increase
our knowledge about people as detectors of deception.
All three studies investigated different aspects of the
hypothesis that people with accurate beliefs concerning
the behaviors that predict deception are better at
detecting deception, but only when those beliefs are
activated. Although Studies III and IV did not find
direct evidence for either of the two postulated
hypotheses, they did provide indirect evidence to suggest
that beliefs are indeed related to a person's accuracy in
detecting deception. Because only one study to date
(Anderson et al
. ,
1999) has investigated the relationship
between beliefs and accuracy, these studies provide
knowledge to further our understanding of the role
beliefs have in the way people attribute deception.
These studies also showed additional evidence
confirming that people, in general, can distinguish
between those who are being honest and those who are
being dishonest. Kraut (1980) suggests that people, on
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average, are accurate 60% of the time, which is not very
impressive if we consider that the chance level is 50%.
The main effects for type of message confirmed Kraut's
observation that, in general, people can distinguish
between honest and dishonest targets. Furthermore, the
mean difference of judges' ratings between honest and
dishonest messages on all dependent variables for all
studies was not very impressive, again replicating
Kraut's (1980) observations.
This research was designed to support the idea that
both cognitive and social factors affect the way people
attribute deception and ultimately affect people's
accuracy in detecting deception. Traditional methods of
deception detection training have taught only part of the
necessary skills to be a good lie detector - what target
persons do when they attempt to deceive. The results of
the present studies suggest that teaching methods should
also pay attention to judges' motivations, the way they
process information and what makes people suspicious.
In conclusion, the approach to deception detection
investigated in this dissertation suggests that
contextual and social cognitive factors, in combination
with people's beliefs about the behaviors that predict
deception, jointly determine the detection accuracy of a
judge. The pattern of results for all four studies
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revealed some evidence for the hypothesis that people who
have accurate beliefs about the cues that predict
deception are better at deception detection when those
beliefs are activated. Although the pattern of results
was not as consistent with the hypothesis as expected,
the evidence does point to the importance of beliefs
about cues predictive of deception as determinants of a
person's attributions of deception. This evidence, by
itself, has an impact on our understanding of the process
by which people decide whether someone is being honest or
dishonest. Besides Anderson et al
.
(1999), no other set
of studies has found evidence suggesting a relationship
between deception detection accuracy and the beliefs
people hold about the cues that predict deception.
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APPENDIX A
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Study I
.
1.
To what extent do you think this person was truthful?
(Anchors: (1) very untruthful -- (9) very truthful)
2. To what extent do you believe these arguments
represent what the person actually believes?
(Anchors: (1) not at all -- (9) completely)
3. Was this person basically honest or dishonest?
(Forced Choice: Honest -- Dishonest)
Study III.
1.
To what extent do you think this person was truthful?
(Anchors: (1) very untruthful -- (9) very truthful)
2. How likely is it that this person is carrying
contraband?
(Anchors: (1) very unlikely -- (9) very likely)
3 . Would you stop and search this person for contraband?
(Forced Choice: Yes -- No)
Study IV.
1. To what extent do you think this person was truthful?
(Anchors: (1) very untruthful -- (9) very truthful)
2. How likely is it that this person committed the
traffic violation?
(Anchors: (1) very unlikely -- (9) very likely)
3. Do you believe this person is telling the truth about
the incident?
(Forced Choice: Yes -- No)
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APPENDIX B
NONVERBAL CUE BELIEF QUESTIONNAIRE
For each question, think about what behaviors people not
telling the truth do MORE than people telling the truth.
How likely is it for people not telling the truth to:
(For Study I all questions were answered on a 9-point
scale anchored at (1) very unlikely and (9) very likely,
while Studies II through IV used a forced-choice version
of this questionnaire-* )-
1. increase eye contact with the person they are talking
to? (r)
2. say more "ahs" and "urns" and speech hesitations?
3 . smile more? (r
)
4. talk more slowly? (r)
5. commit fewer speech errors? (r)
6. make more facial expressions and gestures? (r)
7. make many head movements (nodding, turning head side
to
side, etc
.
) ? (r
)
8. shift their posture more?(r)
9. say more negative statements?
10. give more irrelevant information?
11. give more responses that are too general?
12. make many self references when talking? (r)
13 . have more discrepancy in what they say?
14. have the pitch of their voice increase more?
15. have their eyes blink more?
16. shrug more?(r)
17. perform more "adaptors" such as scratching, rubbing
hands, etc.?
18. make more movement of their legs increases (crossing
legs
,
etc
.
) ? (r
)
Note: items marked with (r) are reversed scored.
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APPENDIX C
LETTER OF COMMITMENT
METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA
METRO-DADE*
AVIATION DEPARTMENT
RO. BOX 592075
MIAMI, FLORIDA 33159-2075
(305) 876-7000
December 3, 1999
Mr. James A. Forrest
University ofMassachusetts
Tobin Hall
Box 37710
Amherst, MA 01003-7710
Dear Mr. Forrest:
This will confirm our commitment to accommodate your request to conduct filming at the
Miami International Airport, as part ofyour proposed study. It should be clearly understood that we
reserve the right to limit access to certain areas of the airport, as well as restrict the hours during
which the subject filming may be conducted in the airport terminal. We have a responsibility to
ensure the safety and convenience of our airport users, and must abide by local, state, and federal
security regulations governing activities at the nation’s airports. Based on our discussions, I am
confident that this phase ofyour study will meet with success.
As to phase II ofyour study, I am in the process of reaching the appropriate decision maker
within the U.S. Customs Service. I will be meeting with the new Regional Director of that agency
this coining week and will ask for his cooperation. I will be in contact with you following that
In the interest oftime, I am sending you a copy ofthis letter via facsimile. The original of this
correspondence will reachyou in due course. In the meantime, should you have any questions, please
call me or reach me via electronic mail.
meeting.
Aan^ury Zuriarra
Deputy Director
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APPENDIX D
CORRECT AND INCORRECT LIST OF BEHAVIORS
THAT PREDICT DECEPTION
CORRECT INCORRECT
(1) More speech (1) More eye contact with
hesitations other person
(2) More speech errors (2) Smile more
(3) More negative (3) Talk more slowly
statements (4) More facial
(4) Give more irrelevant expressions
information and gestures
(5) More "adaptors" such (5) More head movements
as scratching (nodding)
(6) More blinking (6) Shift their posture
(7) More discrepancy in more
what they say (7) Shrug more
(8) Pitch of their voice (8) More leg movement
increases (crossing legs)
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